/* Task credentials management - see Documentation/security/credentials.rst * * Copyright (C) 2008 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED #include #endif #if 0 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \ printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n", \ current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__) #else #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \ do { \ if (0) \ no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] " FMT "\n", \ current->comm, current->pid, ##__VA_ARGS__); \ } while (0) #endif static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar; /* init to 2 - one for init_task, one to ensure it is never freed */ struct group_info init_groups = { .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2) }; /* * The initial credentials for the initial task */ #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED struct cred init_cred __kdp_ro = { #else struct cred init_cred = { #endif .usage = ATOMIC_INIT(4), #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS .subscribers = ATOMIC_INIT(2), .magic = CRED_MAGIC, #endif .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .gid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, .suid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .sgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, .euid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .egid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, .fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .fsgid = GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, .securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT, .cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET, .cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET, .cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET, .cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET, .user = INIT_USER, .user_ns = &init_user_ns, .group_info = &init_groups, #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED .use_cnt = (atomic_t *)&init_cred_use_cnt, .bp_task = &init_task, .bp_pgd = (void *) 0, .type = 0, #endif }; #ifndef CONFIG_KDP_CRED static inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n); #endif } #endif static inline int read_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *cred) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS return atomic_read(&cred->subscribers); #else return 0; #endif } static inline void alter_cred_subscribers(const struct cred *_cred, int n) { #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred; atomic_add(n, &cred->subscribers); #endif } /* * The RCU callback to actually dispose of a set of credentials */ static void put_cred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) { struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct cred, rcu); kdebug("put_cred_rcu(%p)", cred); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC_DEAD || atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0 || read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0) panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with" " mag %x, put %p, usage %d, subscr %d\n", cred, cred->magic, cred->put_addr, atomic_read(&cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(cred)); #else if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0) panic("CRED: put_cred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n", cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage)); #endif security_cred_free(cred); key_put(cred->session_keyring); key_put(cred->process_keyring); key_put(cred->thread_keyring); key_put(cred->request_key_auth); if (cred->group_info) put_group_info(cred->group_info); free_uid(cred->user); put_user_ns(cred->user_ns); kmem_cache_free(cred_jar, cred); } /** * __put_cred - Destroy a set of credentials * @cred: The record to release * * Destroy a set of credentials on which no references remain. */ void __put_cred(struct cred *cred) { kdebug("__put_cred(%p{%d,%d})", cred, atomic_read(&cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(cred)); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long)cred)) BUG_ON(ROCRED_UC_READ(cred) != 0); else #endif BUG_ON(atomic_read(&cred->usage) != 0); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(cred) != 0); cred->magic = CRED_MAGIC_DEAD; cred->put_addr = __builtin_return_address(0); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if(cred == current->cred) printk("[KDP] cred->security: 0x%lx\n", cred->security); #endif BUG_ON(cred == current->cred); BUG_ON(cred == current->real_cred); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long)cred)) { if (GET_ROCRED_RCU(cred)->non_rcu) put_rocred_rcu(&(GET_ROCRED_RCU(cred)->rcu)); else call_rcu(&(GET_ROCRED_RCU(cred)->rcu), put_rocred_rcu); } else { #endif if (cred->non_rcu) put_cred_rcu(&cred->rcu); else call_rcu(&cred->rcu, put_cred_rcu); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED } #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__put_cred); /* * Clean up a task's credentials when it exits */ void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk) { struct cred *cred; kdebug("exit_creds(%u,%p,%p,{%d,%d})", tsk->pid, tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred, atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred)); cred = (struct cred *) tsk->real_cred; tsk->real_cred = NULL; validate_creds(cred); alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1); put_cred(cred); cred = (struct cred *) tsk->cred; tsk->cred = NULL; validate_creds(cred); alter_cred_subscribers(cred, -1); put_cred(cred); } /** * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials * @task: The task to query * * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go * away. Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted. * * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked. */ const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task) { const struct cred *cred; #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED int inc_test; #endif rcu_read_lock(); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED do { cred = __task_cred((task)); BUG_ON(!cred); if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long)cred)) inc_test = ROCRED_UC_INC_NOT_ZERO(cred); else inc_test = atomic_inc_not_zero(&((struct cred *)cred)->usage); } while (!inc_test); #else do { cred = __task_cred((task)); BUG_ON(!cred); } while (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&((struct cred *)cred)->usage)); #endif rcu_read_unlock(); return cred; } /* * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a * later date without risk of ENOMEM. */ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void) { struct cred *new; new = kmem_cache_zalloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) return NULL; atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS new->magic = CRED_MAGIC; #endif if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0) goto error; return new; error: abort_creds(new); return NULL; } /** * prepare_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials for modification * * Prepare a new set of task credentials for modification. A task's creds * shouldn't generally be modified directly, therefore this function is used to * prepare a new copy, which the caller then modifies and then commits by * calling commit_creds(). * * Preparation involves making a copy of the objective creds for modification. * * Returns a pointer to the new creds-to-be if successful, NULL otherwise. * * Call commit_creds() or abort_creds() to clean up. */ struct cred *prepare_creds(void) { struct task_struct *task = current; const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; validate_process_creds(); new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) return NULL; kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new); old = task->cred; memcpy(new, old, sizeof(struct cred)); new->non_rcu = 0; atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); set_cred_subscribers(new, 0); get_group_info(new->group_info); get_uid(new->user); get_user_ns(new->user_ns); #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS key_get(new->session_keyring); key_get(new->process_keyring); key_get(new->thread_keyring); key_get(new->request_key_auth); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY new->security = NULL; #endif if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0) goto error; validate_creds(new); return new; error: abort_creds(new); return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds); /* * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve() * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex */ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void) { struct cred *new; new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return new; #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS /* newly exec'd tasks don't get a thread keyring */ key_put(new->thread_keyring); new->thread_keyring = NULL; /* inherit the session keyring; new process keyring */ key_put(new->process_keyring); new->process_keyring = NULL; #endif return new; } /* * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork() * * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new * set. * * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its * objective and subjective credentials */ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags) { struct cred *new; int ret; #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (!kdp_enable) { #endif if ( #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS !p->cred->thread_keyring && #endif clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD ) { p->real_cred = get_cred(p->cred); get_cred(p->cred); alter_cred_subscribers(p->cred, 2); kdebug("share_creds(%p{%d,%d})", p->cred, atomic_read(&p->cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(p->cred)); atomic_inc(&p->cred->user->processes); return 0; } #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED } #endif new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) return -ENOMEM; if (clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) { ret = create_user_ns(new); if (ret < 0) goto error_put; } #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS /* new threads get their own thread keyrings if their parent already * had one */ if (new->thread_keyring) { key_put(new->thread_keyring); new->thread_keyring = NULL; if (clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD) install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new); } /* The process keyring is only shared between the threads in a process; * anything outside of those threads doesn't inherit. */ if (!(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD)) { key_put(new->process_keyring); new->process_keyring = NULL; } #endif atomic_inc(&new->user->processes); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (kdp_enable) { p->cred = p->real_cred = prepare_ro_creds(new, CMD_COPY_CREDS, (u64)p); put_cred(new); } else { p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new); alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2); validate_creds(new); } #else p->cred = p->real_cred = get_cred(new); alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2); validate_creds(new); #endif return 0; error_put: put_cred(new); return ret; } static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set, const struct cred *subset) { const struct user_namespace *set_ns = set->user_ns; const struct user_namespace *subset_ns = subset->user_ns; /* If the two credentials are in the same user namespace see if * the capabilities of subset are a subset of set. */ if (set_ns == subset_ns) return cap_issubset(subset->cap_permitted, set->cap_permitted); /* The credentials are in a different user namespaces * therefore one is a subset of the other only if a set is an * ancestor of subset and set->euid is owner of subset or one * of subsets ancestors. */ for (;subset_ns != &init_user_ns; subset_ns = subset_ns->parent) { if ((set_ns == subset_ns->parent) && uid_eq(subset_ns->owner, set->euid)) return true; } return false; } /** * commit_creds - Install new credentials upon the current task * @new: The credentials to be assigned * * Install a new set of credentials to the current task, using RCU to replace * the old set. Both the objective and the subjective credentials pointers are * updated. This function may not be called if the subjective credentials are * in an overridden state. * * This function eats the caller's reference to the new credentials. * * Always returns 0 thus allowing this function to be tail-called at the end * of, say, sys_setgid(). */ int commit_creds(struct cred *new) { struct task_struct *task = current; const struct cred *old = task->real_cred; kdebug("commit_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new, atomic_read(&new->usage), read_cred_subscribers(new)); BUG_ON(task->cred != old); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(old) < 2); validate_creds(old); validate_creds(new); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long)new)) BUG_ON(ROCRED_UC_READ(new) < 1); else #endif BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1); get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */ /* dumpability changes */ if (!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) || !gid_eq(old->egid, new->egid) || !uid_eq(old->fsuid, new->fsuid) || !gid_eq(old->fsgid, new->fsgid) || !cred_cap_issubset(old, new)) { if (task->mm) set_dumpable(task->mm, suid_dumpable); task->pdeath_signal = 0; /* * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable, * the dumpability change must become visible before * the credential change; otherwise, a __ptrace_may_access() * racing with this change may be able to attach to a task it * shouldn't be able to attach to (as if the task had dropped * privileges without becoming nondumpable). * Pairs with a read barrier in __ptrace_may_access(). */ smp_wmb(); } /* alter the thread keyring */ if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) key_fsuid_changed(task); if (!gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid)) key_fsgid_changed(task); /* do it * RLIMIT_NPROC limits on user->processes have already been checked * in set_user(). */ alter_cred_subscribers(new, 2); if (new->user != old->user) atomic_inc(&new->user->processes); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (kdp_enable) { struct cred *new_ro; new_ro = prepare_ro_creds(new, CMD_COMMIT_CREDS, 0); rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new_ro); rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new_ro); } else { rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new); rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new); } #else rcu_assign_pointer(task->real_cred, new); rcu_assign_pointer(task->cred, new); #endif if (new->user != old->user) atomic_dec(&old->user->processes); alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2); /* send notifications */ if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) || !uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) || !uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid) || !uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_UID); if (!gid_eq(new->gid, old->gid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->egid) || !gid_eq(new->sgid, old->sgid) || !gid_eq(new->fsgid, old->fsgid)) proc_id_connector(task, PROC_EVENT_GID); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (kdp_enable) { put_cred(new); put_cred(new); } #endif /* release the old obj and subj refs both */ put_cred(old); put_cred(old); return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(commit_creds); /** * abort_creds - Discard a set of credentials and unlock the current task * @new: The credentials that were going to be applied * * Discard a set of credentials that were under construction and unlock the * current task. */ void abort_creds(struct cred *new) { kdebug("abort_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new, atomic_read(&new->usage), read_cred_subscribers(new)); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS BUG_ON(read_cred_subscribers(new) != 0); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long)new)) BUG_ON(ROCRED_UC_READ(new) < 1); else #endif BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1); put_cred(new); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(abort_creds); /** * override_creds - Override the current process's subjective credentials * @new: The credentials to be assigned * * Install a set of temporary override subjective credentials on the current * process, returning the old set for later reversion. */ const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *new) { const struct cred *old = current->cred; kdebug("override_creds(%p{%d,%d})", new, atomic_read(&new->usage), read_cred_subscribers(new)); validate_creds(old); validate_creds(new); /* * NOTE! This uses 'get_new_cred()' rather than 'get_cred()'. * * That means that we do not clear the 'non_rcu' flag, since * we are only installing the cred into the thread-synchronous * '->cred' pointer, not the '->real_cred' pointer that is * visible to other threads under RCU. * * Also note that we did validate_creds() manually, not depending * on the validation in 'get_cred()'. */ get_new_cred((struct cred *)new); alter_cred_subscribers(new, 1); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (kdp_enable) { volatile unsigned int kdp_use_count = kdp_get_usecount((struct cred *)new); struct cred *new_ro; new_ro = prepare_ro_creds((struct cred *)new, CMD_OVRD_CREDS, kdp_use_count); GET_ROCRED_RCU(new_ro)->reflected_cred = (void *)new; rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new_ro); } else #endif rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, new); alter_cred_subscribers(old, -1); kdebug("override_creds() = %p{%d,%d}", old, atomic_read(&old->usage), read_cred_subscribers(old)); return old; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(override_creds); /** * revert_creds - Revert a temporary subjective credentials override * @old: The credentials to be restored * * Revert a temporary set of override subjective credentials to an old set, * discarding the override set. */ void revert_creds(const struct cred *old) { const struct cred *override = current->cred; kdebug("revert_creds(%p{%d,%d})", old, atomic_read(&old->usage), read_cred_subscribers(old)); validate_creds(old); validate_creds(override); alter_cred_subscribers(old, 1); rcu_assign_pointer(current->cred, old); alter_cred_subscribers(override, -1); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED if (kdp_enable) { if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long)override)){ if(GET_ROCRED_RCU(override)->reflected_cred) put_cred((struct cred *)GET_ROCRED_RCU(override)->reflected_cred); put_cred(override); } } #endif put_cred(override); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(revert_creds); /* * initialise the credentials stuff */ void __init cred_init(void) { /* allocate a slab in which we can store credentials */ cred_jar = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar", sizeof(struct cred), 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, NULL); #ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED kdp_cred_init(); #endif } /** * prepare_kernel_cred - Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service * @daemon: A userspace daemon to be used as a reference * * Prepare a set of credentials for a kernel service. This can then be used to * override a task's own credentials so that work can be done on behalf of that * task that requires a different subjective context. * * @daemon is used to provide a base for the security record, but can be NULL. * If @daemon is supplied, then the security data will be derived from that; * otherwise they'll be set to 0 and no groups, full capabilities and no keys. * * The caller may change these controls afterwards if desired. * * Returns the new credentials or NULL if out of memory. * * Does not take, and does not return holding current->cred_replace_mutex. */ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon) { const struct cred *old; struct cred *new; new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL); if (!new) return NULL; kdebug("prepare_kernel_cred() alloc %p", new); if (daemon) old = get_task_cred(daemon); else old = get_cred(&init_cred); validate_creds(old); *new = *old; new->non_rcu = 0; atomic_set(&new->usage, 1); set_cred_subscribers(new, 0); get_uid(new->user); get_user_ns(new->user_ns); get_group_info(new->group_info); #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS new->session_keyring = NULL; new->process_keyring = NULL; new->thread_keyring = NULL; new->request_key_auth = NULL; new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING; #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY new->security = NULL; #endif if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT) < 0) goto error; put_cred(old); validate_creds(new); return new; error: put_cred(new); put_cred(old); return NULL; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred); /** * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter * @secid: The LSM security ID to set * * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. */ int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override); /** * set_security_override_from_ctx - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter * @secctx: The LSM security context to generate the security ID from. * * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. The * security ID is specified in string form as a security context to be * interpreted by the LSM. */ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx) { u32 secid; int ret; ret = security_secctx_to_secid(secctx, strlen(secctx), &secid); if (ret < 0) return ret; return set_security_override(new, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx); /** * set_create_files_as - Set the LSM file create context in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter * @inode: The inode to take the context from * * Change the LSM file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same * as the object context of the specified inode, so that the new inodes have * the same MAC context as that inode. */ int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid)) return -EINVAL; new->fsuid = inode->i_uid; new->fsgid = inode->i_gid; return security_kernel_create_files_as(new, inode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as); #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred) { if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC) return true; #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX /* * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or * security_prepare_creds() returned an error. */ if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) { if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE) return true; if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) == (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8)) return true; } #endif return false; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(creds_are_invalid); /* * dump invalid credentials */ static void dump_invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *label, const struct task_struct *tsk) { printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: %s credentials: %p %s%s%s\n", label, cred, cred == &init_cred ? "[init]" : "", cred == tsk->real_cred ? "[real]" : "", cred == tsk->cred ? "[eff]" : ""); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->magic=%x, put_addr=%p\n", cred->magic, cred->put_addr); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->usage=%d, subscr=%d\n", atomic_read(&cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(cred)); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*uid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n", from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->uid), from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->euid), from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->suid), from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid)); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->*gid = { %d,%d,%d,%d }\n", from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->gid), from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->egid), from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid), from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid)); #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security is %p\n", cred->security); if ((unsigned long) cred->security >= PAGE_SIZE && (((unsigned long) cred->security & 0xffffff00) != (POISON_FREE << 24 | POISON_FREE << 16 | POISON_FREE << 8))) printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: ->security {%x, %x}\n", ((u32*)cred->security)[0], ((u32*)cred->security)[1]); #endif } /* * report use of invalid credentials */ void __invalid_creds(const struct cred *cred, const char *file, unsigned line) { printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid credentials\n"); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line); dump_invalid_creds(cred, "Specified", current); BUG(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__invalid_creds); /* * check the credentials on a process */ void __validate_process_creds(struct task_struct *tsk, const char *file, unsigned line) { if (tsk->cred == tsk->real_cred) { if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 2 || creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred))) goto invalid_creds; } else { if (unlikely(read_cred_subscribers(tsk->real_cred) < 1 || read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred) < 1 || creds_are_invalid(tsk->real_cred) || creds_are_invalid(tsk->cred))) goto invalid_creds; } return; invalid_creds: printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Invalid process credentials\n"); printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: At %s:%u\n", file, line); dump_invalid_creds(tsk->real_cred, "Real", tsk); if (tsk->cred != tsk->real_cred) dump_invalid_creds(tsk->cred, "Effective", tsk); else printk(KERN_ERR "CRED: Effective creds == Real creds\n"); BUG(); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__validate_process_creds); /* * check creds for do_exit() */ void validate_creds_for_do_exit(struct task_struct *tsk) { kdebug("validate_creds_for_do_exit(%p,%p{%d,%d})", tsk->real_cred, tsk->cred, atomic_read(&tsk->cred->usage), read_cred_subscribers(tsk->cred)); __validate_process_creds(tsk, __FILE__, __LINE__); } #endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS */