/* * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation * * Author: * Mimi Zohar * Kylene Hall * * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License. * * File: evm_main.c * implements evm_inode_setxattr, evm_inode_post_setxattr, * evm_inode_removexattr, and evm_verifyxattr */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "evm.h" int evm_initialized; static const char * const integrity_status_msg[] = { "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" }; int evm_hmac_attrs; static struct xattr_list evm_config_default_xattrnames[] = { #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX {.name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX}, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACK}, #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_EXTRA_SMACK_XATTRS {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC}, {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE}, {.name = XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP}, #endif #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR {.name = XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR}, #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE {.name = XATTR_NAME_IMA}, #endif {.name = XATTR_NAME_CAPS}, }; LIST_HEAD(evm_config_xattrnames); static int evm_fixmode; static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) { if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0) evm_fixmode = 1; return 0; } __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); static void __init evm_init_config(void) { int i, xattrs; xattrs = ARRAY_SIZE(evm_config_default_xattrnames); pr_info("Initialising EVM extended attributes:\n"); for (i = 0; i < xattrs; i++) { pr_info("%s\n", evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].name); list_add_tail(&evm_config_default_xattrnames[i].list, &evm_config_xattrnames); } #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID evm_hmac_attrs |= EVM_ATTR_FSUUID; #endif pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs); } static bool evm_key_loaded(void) { return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); } static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct xattr_list *xattr; int error; int count = 0; if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, xattr->name, NULL, 0); if (error < 0) { if (error == -ENODATA) continue; return error; } count++; } return count; } /* * evm_verify_hmac - calculate and compare the HMAC with the EVM xattr * * Compute the HMAC on the dentry's protected set of extended attributes * and compare it against the stored security.evm xattr. * * For performance: * - use the previoulsy retrieved xattr value and length to calculate the * HMAC.) * - cache the verification result in the iint, when available. * * Returns integrity status */ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; struct signature_v2_hdr *hdr; enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; struct evm_digest digest; struct inode *inode; int rc, xattr_len; if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status; /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ /* first need to know the sig type */ rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS); if (rc <= 0) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; if (rc == -ENODATA) { rc = evm_find_protected_xattrs(dentry); if (rc > 0) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOLABEL; else if (rc == 0) evm_status = INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS; /* new file */ } else if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } goto out; } xattr_len = rc; /* check value type */ switch (xattr_data->type) { case EVM_XATTR_HMAC: if (xattr_len != sizeof(struct evm_ima_xattr_data)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } digest.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, &digest); if (rc) break; rc = crypto_memneq(xattr_data->digest, digest.digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (rc) rc = -EINVAL; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: /* accept xattr with non-empty signature field */ if (xattr_len <= sizeof(struct signature_v2_hdr)) { evm_status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; goto out; } hdr = (struct signature_v2_hdr *)xattr_data; digest.hdr.algo = hdr->hash_algo; rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, &digest); if (rc) break; rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, digest.digest, digest.hdr.length); if (!rc) { inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { if (iint) iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG; evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE; } else if (!IS_RDONLY(inode) && !(inode->i_sb->s_readonly_remount) && !IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)) { evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } } break; default: rc = -EINVAL; break; } if (rc) evm_status = (rc == -ENODATA) ? INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS : INTEGRITY_FAIL; out: if (iint) iint->evm_status = evm_status; kfree(xattr_data); return evm_status; } static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name) { int namelen; int found = 0; struct xattr_list *xattr; namelen = strlen(req_xattr_name); list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { if ((strlen(xattr->name) == namelen) && (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name, namelen) == 0)) { found = 1; break; } if (strncmp(req_xattr_name, xattr->name + XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN, strlen(req_xattr_name)) == 0) { found = 1; break; } } return found; } /** * evm_verifyxattr - verify the integrity of the requested xattr * @dentry: object of the verify xattr * @xattr_name: requested xattr * @xattr_value: requested xattr value * @xattr_value_len: requested xattr value length * * Calculate the HMAC for the given dentry and verify it against the stored * security.evm xattr. For performance, use the xattr value and length * previously retrieved to calculate the HMAC. * * Returns the xattr integrity status. * * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. */ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; if (!iint) { iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); if (!iint) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, iint); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_verifyxattr); /* * evm_verify_current_integrity - verify the dentry's metadata integrity * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * * Verify and return the dentry's metadata integrity. The exceptions are * before EVM is initialized or in 'fix' mode. */ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) return 0; return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } /* * evm_protect_xattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * * Prevent security.evm from being modified or removed without the * necessary permissions or when the existing value is invalid. * * The posix xattr acls are 'system' prefixed, which normally would not * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable. */ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { enum integrity_status evm_status; if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; } else if (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) { if (!posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name)) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) return 0; goto out; } evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry)); if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) return 0; /* exception for pseudo filesystems */ if (dentry->d_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC || dentry->d_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name, "update_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); } out: if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; } /** * evm_inode_setxattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * * Before allowing the 'security.evm' protected xattr to be updated, * verify the existing value is valid. As only the kernel should have * access to the EVM encrypted key needed to calculate the HMAC, prevent * userspace from writing HMAC value. Writing 'security.evm' requires * requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges. */ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded */ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) return 0; if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) return -EPERM; } return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } /** * evm_inode_removexattr - protect the EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Removing 'security.evm' requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileges and that * the current value is valid. */ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded */ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) return 0; return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; } /** * evm_inode_post_setxattr - update 'security.evm' to reflect the changes * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * @xattr_value: pointer to the new extended attribute value * @xattr_value_len: pointer to the new extended attribute value length * * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect the change. * * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from * __vfs_setxattr_noperm(). The caller of which has taken the inode's * i_mutex lock. */ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); } /** * evm_inode_post_removexattr - update 'security.evm' after removing the xattr * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name * * Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr. * * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex. */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } /** * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though * there's no HMAC key loaded */ if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) return 0; if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) || (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) return 0; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); return -EPERM; } /** * evm_inode_post_setattr - update 'security.evm' after modifying metadata * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry * @ia_valid: for the UID and GID status * * For now, update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect UID/GID * changes. * * This function is called from notify_change(), which expects the caller * to lock the inode's i_mutex. */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { if (!evm_key_loaded()) return; if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0); } /* * evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm */ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, struct xattr *evm_xattr) { struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; int rc; if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) return 0; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); if (!xattr_data) return -ENOMEM; xattr_data->type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC; rc = evm_init_hmac(inode, lsm_xattr, xattr_data->digest); if (rc < 0) goto out; evm_xattr->value = xattr_data; evm_xattr->value_len = sizeof(*xattr_data); evm_xattr->name = XATTR_EVM_SUFFIX; return 0; out: kfree(xattr_data); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_inode_init_security); #ifdef CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 void __init evm_load_x509(void) { int rc; rc = integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, CONFIG_EVM_X509_PATH); if (!rc) evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_X509; } #endif static int __init init_evm(void) { int error; struct list_head *pos, *q; struct xattr_list *xattr; evm_init_config(); error = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM); if (error) goto error; error = evm_init_secfs(); if (error < 0) { pr_info("Error registering secfs\n"); goto error; } error: if (error != 0) { if (!list_empty(&evm_config_xattrnames)) { list_for_each_safe(pos, q, &evm_config_xattrnames) { xattr = list_entry(pos, struct xattr_list, list); list_del(pos); } } } return error; } late_initcall(init_evm); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Extended Verification Module"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");