kernel_samsung_a34x-permissive/drivers/uh/kdp.c
2024-04-28 15:49:01 +02:00

687 lines
19 KiB
C
Executable file

#include <asm-generic/sections.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/slub_def.h>
#include <linux/kdp.h>
#include <linux/cred.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/init_task.h>
#include <../../fs/mount.h>
/* security/selinux/include/objsec.h */
struct task_security_struct {
u32 osid; /* SID prior to last execve */
u32 sid; /* current SID */
u32 exec_sid; /* exec SID */
u32 create_sid; /* fscreate SID */
u32 keycreate_sid; /* keycreate SID */
u32 sockcreate_sid; /* fscreate SID */
void *bp_cred;
};
/* security/selinux/hooks.c */
struct task_security_struct init_sec __kdp_ro;
int kdp_enable __kdp_ro = 0;
static int __check_verifiedboot __kdp_ro = 0;
static int __is_kdp_recovery __kdp_ro = 0;
#define VERITY_PARAM_LENGTH 20
static char verifiedbootstate[VERITY_PARAM_LENGTH];
#ifdef CONFIG_SAMSUNG_PRODUCT_SHIP
extern int selinux_enforcing __kdp_ro_aligned;
extern int ss_initialized __kdp_ro_aligned;
#endif
void __init kdp_init(void)
{
struct kdp_init cred;
memset((void *)&cred, 0, sizeof(kdp_init));
cred._srodata = (u64)__start_rodata;
cred._erodata = (u64)__end_rodata;
#ifdef CONFIG_KDP
cred.init_mm_pgd = (u64)swapper_pg_dir;
#endif
cred.credSize = sizeof(struct cred);
cred.sp_size = sizeof(struct task_security_struct);
cred.pgd_mm = offsetof(struct mm_struct,pgd);
cred.uid_cred = offsetof(struct cred,uid);
cred.euid_cred = offsetof(struct cred,euid);
cred.gid_cred = offsetof(struct cred,gid);
cred.egid_cred = offsetof(struct cred,egid);
cred.bp_pgd_cred = offsetof(struct cred,bp_pgd);
cred.bp_task_cred = offsetof(struct cred,bp_task);
cred.type_cred = offsetof(struct cred,type);
cred.security_cred = offsetof(struct cred,security);
cred.usage_cred = offsetof(struct cred,use_cnt);
cred.cred_task = offsetof(struct task_struct,cred);
cred.mm_task = offsetof(struct task_struct,mm);
cred.pid_task = offsetof(struct task_struct,pid);
cred.rp_task = offsetof(struct task_struct,real_parent);
cred.comm_task = offsetof(struct task_struct,comm);
cred.bp_cred_secptr = offsetof(struct task_security_struct,bp_cred);
#ifndef CONFIG_KDP
cred.verifiedbootstate = (u64)verifiedbootstate;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SAMSUNG_PRODUCT_SHIP
cred.selinux.selinux_enforcing_va = (u64)&selinux_enforcing;
cred.selinux.ss_initialized_va = (u64)&ss_initialized;
#else
cred.selinux.selinux_enforcing_va = 0;
cred.selinux.ss_initialized_va = 0;
#endif
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, KDP_INIT, (u64)&cred, 0, 0, 0);
}
static int __init verifiedboot_state_setup(char *str)
{
strlcpy(verifiedbootstate, str, sizeof(verifiedbootstate));
if(!strncmp(verifiedbootstate, "orange", sizeof("orange")))
__check_verifiedboot = 1;
return 0;
}
__setup("androidboot.verifiedbootstate=", verifiedboot_state_setup);
static int __init boot_recovery(char *str)
{
int temp = 0;
if (get_option(&str, &temp)) {
__is_kdp_recovery = temp;
return 0;
}
return -EINVAL;
}
early_param("androidboot.boot_recovery", boot_recovery);
inline bool is_kdp_kmem_cache(struct kmem_cache *s)
{
if (s->name &&
(!strncmp(s->name, CRED_JAR_RO, strlen(CRED_JAR_RO)) ||
!strncmp(s->name, TSEC_JAR, strlen(TSEC_JAR)) ||
!strncmp(s->name, VFSMNT_JAR, strlen(VFSMNT_JAR))))
return true;
else
return false;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KDP_CRED
/*------------------------------------------------
* CRED
*------------------------------------------------*/
struct kdp_usecnt init_cred_use_cnt = {
.kdp_use_cnt = ATOMIC_INIT(4),
.kdp_rcu_head.non_rcu = 0,
.kdp_rcu_head.bp_cred = (void *)0,
.kdp_rcu_head.reflected_cred = (void *)0,
};
static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar_ro;
static struct kmem_cache *tsec_jar;
static struct kmem_cache *usecnt_jar;
/* Dummy constructor to make sure we have separate slabs caches. */
static void cred_ctor(void *data){}
static void sec_ctor(void *data){}
static void usecnt_ctor(void *data){}
void __init kdp_cred_init(void)
{
cred_jar_ro = kmem_cache_create("cred_jar_ro", sizeof(struct cred),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, cred_ctor);
if (!cred_jar_ro)
panic("Unable to create RO Cred cache\n");
tsec_jar = kmem_cache_create("tsec_jar", sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, sec_ctor);
if (!tsec_jar)
panic("Unable to create RO security cache\n");
usecnt_jar = kmem_cache_create("usecnt_jar", sizeof(struct kdp_usecnt),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT, usecnt_ctor);
if (!usecnt_jar)
panic("Unable to create use count jar\n");
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, JARRO_TSEC_SIZE, (u64)cred_jar_ro->size, (u64)tsec_jar->size, 0, 0);
}
unsigned int kdp_get_usecount(struct cred *cred)
{
if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long )cred))
return (unsigned int)ROCRED_UC_READ(cred);
else
return atomic_read(&cred->usage);
}
inline struct cred *get_new_cred(struct cred *cred)
{
if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long)cred))
ROCRED_UC_INC(cred);
else
atomic_inc(&cred->usage);
return cred;
}
inline void put_cred(const struct cred *_cred)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) _cred;
validate_creds(cred);
if (is_kdp_protect_addr((unsigned long)cred)) {
if (ROCRED_UC_DEC_AND_TEST(cred))
__put_cred(cred);
} else {
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&(cred)->usage))
__put_cred(cred);
}
}
/* match for kernel/cred.c function */
inline void set_cred_subscribers(struct cred *cred, int n)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
atomic_set(&cred->subscribers, n);
#endif
}
/* Check whether the address belong to Cred Area */
bool is_kdp_protect_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
struct page *page;
void *objp = (void *)addr;
if (!objp)
return false;
if (!kdp_enable)
return false;
if ((addr == ((unsigned long)&init_cred)) ||
(addr == ((unsigned long)&init_sec)))
return true;
page = virt_to_head_page(objp);
s = page->slab_cache;
if (s && (s == cred_jar_ro || s == tsec_jar))
return true;
return false;
}
/* We use another function to free protected creds. */
void put_rocred_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu)
{
struct cred *cred = container_of(rcu, struct ro_rcu_head, rcu)->bp_cred;
if (ROCRED_UC_READ(cred) != 0)
panic("RO_CRED: put_rocred_rcu() sees %p with usage %d\n",
cred, ROCRED_UC_READ(cred));
security_cred_free(cred);
key_put(cred->session_keyring);
key_put(cred->process_keyring);
key_put(cred->thread_keyring);
key_put(cred->request_key_auth);
if (cred->group_info)
put_group_info(cred->group_info);
free_uid(cred->user);
put_user_ns(cred->user_ns);
if(cred->use_cnt)
kmem_cache_free(usecnt_jar,(void *)cred->use_cnt);
kmem_cache_free(cred_jar_ro, cred);
}
/* prepare_ro_creds - Prepare a new set of credentials which is protected by KDP */
struct cred *prepare_ro_creds(struct cred *old, int kdp_cmd, u64 p)
{
u64 pgd = (u64)(current->mm? current->mm->pgd: swapper_pg_dir);
struct cred *new_ro = NULL;
struct cred_param param_data;
void *use_cnt_ptr = NULL;
void *rcu_ptr = NULL;
void *tsec = NULL;
new_ro = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar_ro, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_ro)
panic("[%d] : kmem_cache_alloc() failed", kdp_cmd);
use_cnt_ptr = kmem_cache_alloc(usecnt_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!use_cnt_ptr)
panic("[%d] : Unable to allocate usage pointer\n", kdp_cmd);
// get_usecnt_rcu
rcu_ptr = &(((struct kdp_usecnt *)use_cnt_ptr)->kdp_rcu_head);
((struct ro_rcu_head*)rcu_ptr)->bp_cred = (void *)new_ro;
tsec = kmem_cache_alloc(tsec_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tsec)
panic("[%d] : Unable to allocate security pointer\n", kdp_cmd);
// init
memset((void *)&param_data, 0, sizeof(struct cred_param));
param_data.cred = old;
param_data.cred_ro = new_ro;
param_data.use_cnt_ptr = use_cnt_ptr;
param_data.sec_ptr = tsec;
param_data.type = kdp_cmd;
param_data.use_cnt = (u64)p;
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, PREPARE_RO_CRED, (u64)&param_data, (u64)current, 0, 0);
if (kdp_cmd == CMD_COPY_CREDS) {
if ((new_ro->bp_task != (void *)p) ||
new_ro->security != tsec ||
new_ro->use_cnt != use_cnt_ptr) {
panic("[%d]: KDP Call failed task=0x%lx:0x%lx, sec=0x%lx:0x%lx, usecnt=0x%lx:0x%lx",
kdp_cmd, new_ro->bp_task, (void *)p,
new_ro->security, tsec, new_ro->use_cnt, use_cnt_ptr);
}
} else {
if ((new_ro->bp_task != current) ||
(current->mm && new_ro->bp_pgd != (void *)pgd) ||
(new_ro->security != tsec) ||
(new_ro->use_cnt != use_cnt_ptr)) {
panic("[%d]: KDP Call failed task=0x%lx:0x%lx, sec=0x%lx:0x%lx, usecnt=0x%lx:0x%lx, pgd=0x%lx:0x%lx",
kdp_cmd, new_ro->bp_task, current, new_ro->security, tsec,
new_ro->use_cnt, use_cnt_ptr, new_ro->bp_pgd, (void *)pgd);
}
}
GET_ROCRED_RCU(new_ro)->non_rcu = old->non_rcu;
GET_ROCRED_RCU(new_ro)->reflected_cred = 0;
ROCRED_UC_SET(new_ro, 2);
set_cred_subscribers(new_ro, 0);
get_group_info(new_ro->group_info);
get_uid(new_ro->user);
get_user_ns(new_ro->user_ns);
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
key_get(new_ro->session_keyring);
key_get(new_ro->process_keyring);
key_get(new_ro->thread_keyring);
key_get(new_ro->request_key_auth);
#endif
validate_creds(new_ro);
return new_ro;
}
/* security/selinux/hooks.c */
static bool is_kdp_tsec_jar(unsigned long addr)
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
struct page *page;
void *objp = (void *)addr;
if (!objp)
return false;
page = virt_to_head_page(objp);
s = page->slab_cache;
if (s && s == tsec_jar)
return true;
return false;
}
static inline int chk_invalid_kern_ptr(u64 tsec)
{
return (((u64)tsec >> 39) != (u64)0x1FFFFFF);
}
void kdp_free_security(unsigned long tsec)
{
if (!tsec || chk_invalid_kern_ptr(tsec))
return;
if (is_kdp_tsec_jar(tsec))
kmem_cache_free(tsec_jar, (void *)tsec);
else
kfree((void *)tsec);
}
void kdp_assign_pgd(struct task_struct *p)
{
u64 pgd = (u64)(p->mm? p->mm->pgd: swapper_pg_dir);
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_CRED_PGD, (u64)p->cred, (u64)pgd, 0, 0);
}
struct task_security_struct init_sec __kdp_ro;
static inline unsigned int cmp_sec_integrity(const struct cred *cred, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
if (cred->bp_task != current)
printk(KERN_ERR "[KDP] cred->bp_task: 0x%lx, current: 0x%lx\n",
cred->bp_task, current);
if (mm && (cred->bp_pgd != swapper_pg_dir) && (cred->bp_pgd != mm->pgd ))
printk(KERN_ERR "[KDP] mm: 0x%lx, cred->bp_pgd: 0x%lx, swapper_pg_dir: %p, mm->pgd: 0x%lx\n",
mm, cred->bp_pgd, swapper_pg_dir, mm->pgd, cred->bp_pgd);
return ((cred->bp_task != current) ||
(mm && (!( in_interrupt() || in_softirq())) &&
(cred->bp_pgd != swapper_pg_dir) &&
(cred->bp_pgd != mm->pgd)));
}
static inline bool is_kdp_invalid_cred_sp(u64 cred, u64 sec_ptr)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = (struct task_security_struct *)sec_ptr;
u64 cred_size = sizeof(struct cred);
u64 tsec_size = sizeof(struct task_security_struct);
if((cred == (u64)&init_cred) && (sec_ptr == (u64)&init_sec))
return false;
if (!is_kdp_protect_addr(cred) ||
!is_kdp_protect_addr(cred + cred_size) ||
!is_kdp_protect_addr(sec_ptr) ||
!is_kdp_protect_addr(sec_ptr + tsec_size)) {
printk(KERN_ERR, "[KDP] cred: %d, cred + sizeof(cred): %d, sp: %d, sp + sizeof(tsec): %d",
is_kdp_protect_addr(cred),
is_kdp_protect_addr(cred + cred_size),
is_kdp_protect_addr(sec_ptr),
is_kdp_protect_addr(sec_ptr + tsec_size));
return true;
}
if ((u64)tsec->bp_cred != cred) {
printk(KERN_ERR, "[KDP] %s: tesc->bp_cred: %lx, cred: %lx\n",
__func__, (u64)tsec->bp_cred, cred);
return true;
}
return false;
}
inline int kdp_restrict_fork(struct filename *path)
{
struct cred *shellcred;
if (!strcmp(path->name, "/system/bin/patchoat") ||
!strcmp(path->name, "/system/bin/idmap2")) {
return 0;
}
if(KDP_IS_NONROOT(current)) {
shellcred = prepare_creds();
if (!shellcred)
return 1;
shellcred->uid.val = 2000;
shellcred->gid.val = 2000;
shellcred->euid.val = 2000;
shellcred->egid.val = 2000;
commit_creds(shellcred);
}
return 0;
}
/* This function is related Namespace */
#ifdef CONFIG_KDP_NS
static unsigned int cmp_ns_integrity(void)
{
struct mount *root = NULL;
struct nsproxy *nsp = NULL;
if (in_interrupt() || in_softirq())
return 0;
nsp = current->nsproxy;
if (!ns_protect || !nsp || !nsp->mnt_ns)
return 0;
root = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->root;
if (root != root->mnt->bp_mount) {
printk(KERN_ERR "[KDP] NameSpace Mismatch %lx != %lx\n nsp: 0x%lx, mnt_ns: 0x%lx\n",
root, root->mnt->bp_mount, nsp, nsp->mnt_ns);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#endif // end CONFIG_KDP_NS
/* Main function to verify cred security context of a process */
int security_integrity_current(void)
{
const struct cred *cur_cred = current_cred();
rcu_read_lock();
if (kdp_enable &&
(is_kdp_invalid_cred_sp((u64)cur_cred, (u64)cur_cred->security)
|| cmp_sec_integrity(cur_cred, current->mm)
#ifdef CONFIG_KDP_NS
|| cmp_ns_integrity())) {
#else
)) {
#endif
rcu_read_unlock();
panic("KDP CRED PROTECTION VIOLATION\n");
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KDP_NS
/*------------------------------------------------
* Namespace
*------------------------------------------------*/
unsigned int ns_protect __kdp_ro = 0;
static int dex2oat_count = 0;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mnt_vfsmnt_lock);
static struct super_block *rootfs_sb __kdp_ro = NULL;
static struct super_block *sys_sb __kdp_ro = NULL;
static struct super_block *odm_sb __kdp_ro = NULL;
static struct super_block *vendor_sb __kdp_ro = NULL;
static struct super_block *art_sb __kdp_ro = NULL;
static struct super_block *crypt_sb __kdp_ro = NULL;
static struct super_block *dex2oat_sb __kdp_ro = NULL;
static struct super_block *adbd_sb __kdp_ro = NULL;
static struct kmem_cache *vfsmnt_cache __read_mostly;
void cred_ctor_vfsmount(void *data)
{
/* Dummy constructor to make sure we have separate slabs caches. */
}
void __init kdp_mnt_init(void)
{
struct ns_param nsparam;
vfsmnt_cache = kmem_cache_create("vfsmnt_cache", sizeof(struct vfsmount),
0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC, cred_ctor_vfsmount);
if (!vfsmnt_cache)
panic("Failed to allocate vfsmnt_cache \n");
memset((void *)&nsparam, 0, sizeof(struct ns_param));
nsparam.ns_buff_size = (u64)vfsmnt_cache->size;
nsparam.ns_size = (u64)sizeof(struct vfsmount);
nsparam.bp_offset = (u64)offsetof(struct vfsmount, bp_mount);
nsparam.sb_offset = (u64)offsetof(struct vfsmount, mnt_sb);
nsparam.flag_offset = (u64)offsetof(struct vfsmount, mnt_flags);
nsparam.data_offset = (u64)offsetof(struct vfsmount, data);
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, NS_INIT, (u64)&nsparam, 0, 0, 0);
}
void __init kdp_init_mount_tree(struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
if (!rootfs_sb)
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&rootfs_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_ROOTFS, 0);
}
bool is_kdp_vfsmnt_cache(unsigned long addr)
{
static void *objp;
static struct kmem_cache *s;
static struct page *page;
objp = (void *)addr;
if (!objp)
return false;
page = virt_to_head_page(objp);
s = page->slab_cache;
if (s && s == vfsmnt_cache)
return true;
return false;
}
static int kdp_check_sb_mismatch(struct super_block *sb)
{
if (__is_kdp_recovery || __check_verifiedboot)
return 0;
if ((sb != rootfs_sb) && (sb != sys_sb) && (sb != odm_sb)
&& (sb != vendor_sb) && (sb != art_sb) && (sb != crypt_sb)
&& (sb != dex2oat_sb) && (sb != adbd_sb))
return 1;
return 0;
}
int invalid_drive(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
{
struct super_block *sb = NULL;
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt = NULL;
vfsmnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
if (!vfsmnt || !is_kdp_vfsmnt_cache((unsigned long)vfsmnt)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "[KDP] Invalid Drive : %s, vfsmnt: 0x%lx\n",
bprm->filename, (unsigned long)vfsmnt);
return 1;
}
sb = vfsmnt->mnt_sb;
if (kdp_check_sb_mismatch(sb)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "[KDP] Superblock Mismatch -> %s vfsmnt: 0x%lx, mnt_sb: 0x%lx",
bprm->filename, (unsigned long)vfsmnt, (unsigned long)sb);
printk(KERN_ERR "[KDP] Superblock list : 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx, 0x%lx\n",
(unsigned long)rootfs_sb, (unsigned long)sys_sb, (unsigned long)odm_sb,
(unsigned long)vendor_sb, (unsigned long)art_sb, (unsigned long)crypt_sb,
(unsigned long)dex2oat_sb, (unsigned long)adbd_sb);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#define KDP_CRED_SYS_ID 1000
int is_kdp_priv_task(void)
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current_cred();
if (cred->uid.val <= (uid_t)KDP_CRED_SYS_ID ||
cred->euid.val <= (uid_t)KDP_CRED_SYS_ID ||
cred->gid.val <= (gid_t)KDP_CRED_SYS_ID ||
cred->egid.val <= (gid_t)KDP_CRED_SYS_ID ) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
inline void kdp_set_mnt_root_sb(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *mnt_root, struct super_block *mnt_sb)
{
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_ROOT_SB, (u64)mnt, (u64)mnt_root, (u64)mnt_sb, 0);
}
inline void kdp_assign_mnt_flags(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_FLAGS, (u64)mnt, (u64)flags, 0, 0);
}
inline void kdp_clear_mnt_flags(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
int f = mnt->mnt_flags;
f &= ~flags;
kdp_assign_mnt_flags(mnt, f);
}
inline void kdp_set_mnt_flags(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
int f = mnt->mnt_flags;
f |= flags;
kdp_assign_mnt_flags(mnt, f);
}
void kdp_set_ns_data(struct vfsmount *mnt, void *data)
{
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_DATA, (u64)mnt, (u64)data, 0, 0);
}
int kdp_mnt_alloc_vfsmount(struct mount *mnt)
{
struct vfsmount *vfsmnt = NULL;
vfsmnt = kmem_cache_alloc(vfsmnt_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!vfsmnt)
return 1;
spin_lock(&mnt_vfsmnt_lock);
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_BP, (u64)vfsmnt, (u64)mnt, 0, 0);
mnt->mnt = vfsmnt;
spin_unlock(&mnt_vfsmnt_lock);
return 0;
}
void kdp_free_vfsmount(void *objp)
{
kmem_cache_free(vfsmnt_cache, objp);
}
static void kdp_populate_sb(char *mount_point, struct vfsmount *mnt)
{
if (!mount_point || !mnt)
return;
if (!odm_sb && !strncmp(mount_point, KDP_MOUNT_PRODUCT, KDP_MOUNT_PRODUCT_LEN))
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&odm_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_ODM, 0);
else if (!sys_sb && !strncmp(mount_point, KDP_MOUNT_SYSTEM, KDP_MOUNT_SYSTEM_LEN))
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&sys_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_SYS, 0);
else if (!vendor_sb && !strncmp(mount_point, KDP_MOUNT_VENDOR, KDP_MOUNT_VENDOR_LEN))
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&vendor_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_VENDOR, 0);
else if (!art_sb && !strncmp(mount_point, KDP_MOUNT_ART, KDP_MOUNT_ART_LEN - 1))
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&art_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_ART, 0);
else if (!crypt_sb && !strncmp(mount_point, KDP_MOUNT_CRYPT, KDP_MOUNT_CRYPT_LEN - 1))
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&crypt_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_CRYPT, 0);
else if (!dex2oat_sb && !strncmp(mount_point, KDP_MOUNT_DEX2OAT, KDP_MOUNT_DEX2OAT_LEN - 1))
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&dex2oat_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_DEX2OAT, 0);
else if (!dex2oat_count && !strncmp(mount_point, KDP_MOUNT_DEX2OAT, KDP_MOUNT_DEX2OAT_LEN)) {
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&dex2oat_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_DEX2OAT, 0);
dex2oat_count++;
}
else if (!adbd_sb && !strncmp(mount_point, KDP_MOUNT_ADBD, KDP_MOUNT_ADBD_LEN - 1))
uh_call(UH_APP_KDP, SET_NS_SB_VFSMOUNT, (u64)&adbd_sb, (u64)mnt, KDP_SB_ADBD, 0);
}
int kdp_do_new_mount(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct path *path)
{
char *buf = NULL;
char *dir_name;
buf = kzalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
dir_name = dentry_path_raw(path->dentry, buf, PATH_MAX);
if (!sys_sb || !odm_sb || !vendor_sb || !art_sb || !crypt_sb || !dex2oat_sb || !dex2oat_count || !adbd_sb)
kdp_populate_sb(dir_name, mnt);
kfree(buf);
return 0;
}
#endif