linux/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
Linus Torvalds 86e6b1547b x86: fix user address masking non-canonical speculation issue
It turns out that AMD has a "Meltdown Lite(tm)" issue with non-canonical
accesses in kernel space.  And so using just the high bit to decide
whether an access is in user space or kernel space ends up with the good
old "leak speculative data" if you have the right gadget using the
result:

  CVE-2020-12965 “Transient Execution of Non-Canonical Accesses“

Now, the kernel surrounds the access with a STAC/CLAC pair, and those
instructions end up serializing execution on older Zen architectures,
which closes the speculation window.

But that was true only up until Zen 5, which renames the AC bit [1].
That improves performance of STAC/CLAC a lot, but also means that the
speculation window is now open.

Note that this affects not just the new address masking, but also the
regular valid_user_address() check used by access_ok(), and the asm
version of the sign bit check in the get_user() helpers.

It does not affect put_user() or clear_user() variants, since there's no
speculative result to be used in a gadget for those operations.

Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/80d94591-1297-4afb-b510-c665efd37f10@citrix.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241023094448.GAZxjFkEOOF_DM83TQ@fat_crate.local/ [1]
Link: https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-1010.html
Link: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2108.10771
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Maciej Wieczor-Retman <maciej.wieczor-retman@intel.com> # LAM case
Fixes: 2865baf540 ("x86: support user address masking instead of non-speculative conditional")
Fixes: 6014bc2756 ("x86-64: make access_ok() independent of LAM")
Fixes: b19b74bc99 ("x86/mm: Rework address range check in get_user() and put_user()")
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2024-10-25 09:53:03 -07:00

208 lines
5.4 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_UACCESS_64_H
#define _ASM_X86_UACCESS_64_H
/*
* User space memory access functions
*/
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/kasan-checks.h>
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/runtime-const.h>
/*
* Virtual variable: there's no actual backing store for this,
* it can purely be used as 'runtime_const_ptr(USER_PTR_MAX)'
*/
extern unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX;
#ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING
/*
* Mask out tag bits from the address.
*/
static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
asm (ALTERNATIVE("",
"and " __percpu_arg([mask]) ", %[addr]", X86_FEATURE_LAM)
: [addr] "+r" (addr)
: [mask] "m" (__my_cpu_var(tlbstate_untag_mask)));
return addr;
}
#define untagged_addr(addr) ({ \
unsigned long __addr = (__force unsigned long)(addr); \
(__force __typeof__(addr))__untagged_addr(__addr); \
})
static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr_remote(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long addr)
{
mmap_assert_locked(mm);
return addr & (mm)->context.untag_mask;
}
#define untagged_addr_remote(mm, addr) ({ \
unsigned long __addr = (__force unsigned long)(addr); \
(__force __typeof__(addr))__untagged_addr_remote(mm, __addr); \
})
#endif
#define valid_user_address(x) \
((__force unsigned long)(x) <= runtime_const_ptr(USER_PTR_MAX))
/*
* Masking the user address is an alternative to a conditional
* user_access_begin that can avoid the fencing. This only works
* for dense accesses starting at the address.
*/
static inline void __user *mask_user_address(const void __user *ptr)
{
unsigned long mask;
asm("cmp %1,%0\n\t"
"sbb %0,%0"
:"=r" (mask)
:"r" (ptr),
"0" (runtime_const_ptr(USER_PTR_MAX)));
return (__force void __user *)(mask | (__force unsigned long)ptr);
}
#define masked_user_access_begin(x) ({ \
__auto_type __masked_ptr = (x); \
__masked_ptr = mask_user_address(__masked_ptr); \
__uaccess_begin(); __masked_ptr; })
/*
* User pointers can have tag bits on x86-64. This scheme tolerates
* arbitrary values in those bits rather then masking them off.
*
* Enforce two rules:
* 1. 'ptr' must be in the user part of the address space
* 2. 'ptr+size' must not overflow into kernel addresses
*
* Note that we always have at least one guard page between the
* max user address and the non-canonical gap, allowing us to
* ignore small sizes entirely.
*
* In fact, we could probably remove the size check entirely, since
* any kernel accesses will be in increasing address order starting
* at 'ptr'.
*
* That's a separate optimization, for now just handle the small
* constant case.
*/
static inline bool __access_ok(const void __user *ptr, unsigned long size)
{
if (__builtin_constant_p(size <= PAGE_SIZE) && size <= PAGE_SIZE) {
return valid_user_address(ptr);
} else {
unsigned long sum = size + (__force unsigned long)ptr;
return valid_user_address(sum) && sum >= (__force unsigned long)ptr;
}
}
#define __access_ok __access_ok
/*
* Copy To/From Userspace
*/
/* Handles exceptions in both to and from, but doesn't do access_ok */
__must_check unsigned long
rep_movs_alternative(void *to, const void *from, unsigned len);
static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
copy_user_generic(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long len)
{
stac();
/*
* If CPU has FSRM feature, use 'rep movs'.
* Otherwise, use rep_movs_alternative.
*/
asm volatile(
"1:\n\t"
ALTERNATIVE("rep movsb",
"call rep_movs_alternative", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_FSRM))
"2:\n"
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 2b)
:"+c" (len), "+D" (to), "+S" (from), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: : "memory", "rax");
clac();
return len;
}
static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned long size)
{
return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
}
static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long
raw_copy_to_user(void __user *dst, const void *src, unsigned long size)
{
return copy_user_generic((__force void *)dst, src, size);
}
extern long __copy_user_nocache(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size);
extern long __copy_user_flushcache(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size);
static inline int
__copy_from_user_inatomic_nocache(void *dst, const void __user *src,
unsigned size)
{
long ret;
kasan_check_write(dst, size);
stac();
ret = __copy_user_nocache(dst, src, size);
clac();
return ret;
}
static inline int
__copy_from_user_flushcache(void *dst, const void __user *src, unsigned size)
{
kasan_check_write(dst, size);
return __copy_user_flushcache(dst, src, size);
}
/*
* Zero Userspace.
*/
__must_check unsigned long
rep_stos_alternative(void __user *addr, unsigned long len);
static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long size)
{
might_fault();
stac();
/*
* No memory constraint because it doesn't change any memory gcc
* knows about.
*/
asm volatile(
"1:\n\t"
ALTERNATIVE("rep stosb",
"call rep_stos_alternative", ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_FSRS))
"2:\n"
_ASM_EXTABLE_UA(1b, 2b)
: "+c" (size), "+D" (addr), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
: "a" (0));
clac();
return size;
}
static __always_inline unsigned long clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
{
if (__access_ok(to, n))
return __clear_user(to, n);
return n;
}
#endif /* _ASM_X86_UACCESS_64_H */